SECRET

### INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

# TRENDS IN LABOR SUPPLY AND CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT IN THE USSR 1950-65

CIA/RR IM-458

11 October 1957

#### WARNING

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## TRENDS IN LABOR SUPPLY AND CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT in the USSR\* 1950-65

## Summary

More complete data on population and the utilization of manpower in the USSR have recently been released, making it possible to produce more accurate estimates of Soviet trends in labor supply and civilian employment. These new estimates indicate a relatively full labor supply during the Fifth Five Year Plan (1951-55) and up to 1957 but a sharp decline in the rate of expansion of supply thereafter. The increase in the number of persons who can normally be expected to be economically active in the labor supply is estimated at 8.4 million from 1950 to 1955, an excess of 1.4 million over the 7-million increase in civilian employment.

From 1956 to 1960 the increase in the labor supply attributable to growth in population is estimated at 6.9 million compared with an indicated expansion of civilian employment of 8.3 million. This deficit seems to have been met in 1956 and 1957 by transfers from the "uncounted" to the "counted" segments of the labor force, the uncounted being composed largely of the armed and security forces, forced laborers, and the unemployed. In the absence of any recent indications of significant changes in the level of forced labor or unemployment, it would appear that the majority of the transfers were from the armed forces. Of the 8.3-million increase in civilian employment projected for the period 1956-60, 4.5 million will have already been added in 1956 and 1957, with only 3.8 million added in 1958, 1959, and 1960. The rate of increase in employment for 1956-60 will be greater than that for 1950-55. In addition, the quality of the labor force will probably have improved somewhat by 1960. More workers will be males and persons in the prime working ages (20 to 59). Hence any slowdown in production will probably not be attributable to a slowdown in the growth of civilian employment.

<sup>\*</sup> The estimates and conclusions contained in this memorandum represent the best judgment of ORR as of 1 September 1957.

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The net increase in the labor supply from 1961 to 1965 will be much smaller (4.5 million) than during the Fifth (1951-55) and Sixth (1956-60) Five Year Plans. Thus continued economic expansion will depend to an even greater degree on the growth of productivity unless further demobilization takes place.

## 1. Introduction.

This memorandum compares trends in labor supply and civilian employment in the USSR during the Fifth (1951-55), Sixth (1956-60), and Seventh (1961-65) Five Year Plans. Supply is estimated in terms of the percentage of the various age and sex groups who normally participate in economic activity. Thus it corresponds to the US statistical concept of the labor force. Employment is estimated as the total number of persons in all major categories actually at work in the civilian economy who are in the working ages -- that is, from 15 through 69. Inferences are also drawn on unreported elements in the total labor supply.

Although the supporting data for both series -- labor supply and civilian employment -- leave much to be desired, the trends are so pronounced that the general indications are fairly firm. The short-comings of the data and methodology are discussed in some detail.\*

Because the method used takes into consideration the rate of economic participation of all segments of the population 15 to 69 years of age, it is more precise than former crude comparisons of numbers employed with the traditional working-age group (15 to 59 years of age). During the Fifth Five Year Plan, for instance, additions from the latter group were 7.7 million, but 700,000 in addition were probably added from persons 60 years of age and older.

The trends in labor supply and civilian employment in the USSR for selected years, 1950-65, are shown in Table 1.\*\*

Differences between the two series, shown in Table 1, represent aggregate approximations of several labor force components of uncertain size, the largest segments of which are (a) the military and para-

<sup>\*</sup> See the Appendix.

<sup>\*\*</sup> Table 1 follows on p. 3.

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Table 1

Estimated Labor Supply and Civilian Employment in the Working Ages (15 to 69) in the USSR Selected Years, 1950-65

				MILLION
	Labor S	Supply <u>a</u> /	Civilian E	mployment b/
Year	Total	Increase	<u>Total</u>	Increase
1950 1953 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960	91.6 96.6 100.0 101.7 103.1 104.5 105.8 106.9	5.0 3.4 1.7 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.1	83.4 84.9 90.4 93.2 94.9 96.3 97.6 98.7	1.5 5.5 2.8 1.7 1.4 1.3

a. Based on projections by the US Bureau of the Census of the estimated population of the USSR by age and sex together with estimated percentages of the population of each age and sex group (not in school) who normally participate in economic activity (see Table 4, p. 13, below).

military, (b) that part of forced labor not leased to enterprises, and (c) those normally employed but temporarily unemployed.

## 2. Trends During the Fifth Five Year Plan (1951-55).

During 1950-55 the Soviet labor supply apparently increased by 8.4 million workers at the same time that civilian employment increased by only 7 million. The slower growth of employment is

b. Based from 1950 to 1957 on firm announcements of the number of workers and employees plus estimates of employment in nonstate sectors (kolkhozniki, industrial cooperative handicraftsmen, and certain other smaller components) derived on the basis of reported data and indirect evidence. Based from 1958 to 1960 on the assumption that civilian employment will increase by the same amount as the estimated total labor supply (see Table 2, p. 8, below).

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probably a result of the influence of important national changes occurring during the period. In 1950 the residual effects of the national effort after the war to restore the war-ravaged economy may have induced a higher proportion of persons in the working ages to work than was normally the case by 1955. If work participation rates had actually been the same in 1950 as in 1955, the level of civilian employment would have been lower. From a lower level in 1950 the increase in civilian employment by 1955 would have been more nearly equal to the increase in the total labor supply.

During 1950-53, civilian employment increased at a very slow rate probably because of the Korean War mobilization of the armed forces and perhaps, in 1953, because of increased unemployment arising from amnesties of forced laborers following Stalin's death in April. At least 1 million forced laborers may have been released in 1953 who were probably lent by the MVD to civilian enterprises, where they had probably been counted as workers and employees. The release of these workers undoubtedly increased temporary unemployment and maintained civilian employment at a relatively stable level during 1953.

During 1954-55, civilian employment grew faster than the total labor supply as a result of reversals in the policies of Stalin. Amnestied forced laborers were swelling civilian employment lists in both 1954 and 1955, and the armed forces may have been reduced, especially in 1955, following the August announcement of the plan to demobilize 640,000 servicemen by the end of the year. These changes were undoubtedly associated in part with the desire of the new Soviet government to improve agricultural production. The policy of withdrawing workers from agriculture during 1950-53 -- about 2 million -- was reversed during 1954-55, when more than 3 million were added to agriculture.

## 3. Trends During the Sixth Five Year Plan (1956-60).

During 1956-60 the increase in the total labor supply in the USSR apparently will not be as large as the increase during the preceding 5 years. The increase in population, which contributed 8.4 million available workers from 1950 to 1955, will provide only 6.9 million from 1955 to 1960.

## a. <u>1956</u>.

From 1955 to 1956 the growth in population contributed as much to the total labor supply as the annual average for the preceding

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5 years (1.7 million). Employment, however, expanded much more rapidly, increasing by 2.8 million. The extra 1.1 million workers had to be squeezed from the "fat" which existed somewhere in the labor supply (forced labor, the unemployed, or the armed services). Furthermore, the increase in the number of engineers employed in the national economy was 64,000 greater than the number graduated during the year. Inasmuch as there was no evidence during 1956 of further reductions in forced labor, of absorptions of the unemployed, or of changes in participation rates, reduction of the armed forces seems the most likely source for at least part of this increase. Planned reductions of 640,000 in 1955 and of 1.2 million in 1956-57 have been announced as completed, and numerous items in the Soviet press announce the assignment of these discharged servicemen in the civilian economy. Although it is not possible to ascertain the dates of discharge or the length of time (in leave status, for example) necessary to make the transition, it is highly probable that a considerable number of these men entered civilian employment during 1956 and that some increment will carry over into 1957.

### b. 1957.

The reason for believing that additions to the labor supply in 1957 are expected from sources other than increases in population is that growth in population will probably contribute only about 1.4 million as against a planned increase of 1.7 million workers and employees, leaving a deficit of 300,000.

## c. <u>1958-60</u>.

The USSR apparently will have added 4.5 million workers to civilian employment in 1956 and 1957. During 1958-60, 3.8 million more workers can be added from the increase in population.

#### d. Summary.

A study of the period from 1955 to 1960 as a whole indicates that the relatively slow growth in the total Soviet labor supply may not slow down the growth in civilian employment. The increment of 6.9 million workers which was added by the increase in population plus 1.4 million (apparently released from military service) provides a total increase in civilian employment of 8.3 million workers by 1960, or 1.3 million more workers than were added to civilian employment between 1950 and 1955. The growth in civilian employment, in fact, will have increased at a faster rate during 1956-60 (9.2 percent)

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than during 1951-55 (8.4 percent).

It also appears likely that civilian employment will have improved qualitatively by 1960. The labor supply in 1960 will comprise more males and more workers in the prime working ages (20 to 59), and these additions will have been added to civilian employment. Table 4\* shows that 53.2 percent of the workers in 1960 will be males compared with 52.5 percent in 1955 and 51.4 percent in 1950. The proportion of males will probably increase somewhat further by 1965. Table 4 also shows that the proportion of workers in the prime working ages will have increased to 87.8 percent by 1960 compared with 84.4 percent in 1955 and 84.8 percent in 1950. Little change in this proportion is anticipated between 1960 and 1965.

## 4. Trends During the Seventh Five Year Plan (1961-65).

Expected declines in the number of persons maturing to 15 years of age which have begun in 1957 because of the small number of births and the high infant mortality during World War II will continue to depress the rate of net gain in the total Soviet labor supply well into the 1960-65 period. It is estimated that only a net gain of 4.5 millton in the labor supply can be expected from the increase in population from 1960 to 1965 compared with 6.9 million in the preceding 5 years and 8.4 million during the Fifth Five Year Plan. This would be a gain of 4.2 percent in the labor supply for the Seventh Five Year Plan (1961-65), compared with 6.9 percent for the Sixth Five Year Plan. Unless the USSR adopts policies of further reductions in the armed forces or of large-scale importation of unemployed workers from the European Satellites, the government will probably have to depend more and more on productivity gains to attain anything like past rates of economic growth.

<sup>\*</sup> P. 13, below.

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## APPENDIX

## METHODOLOGY

The methodological problems involved in the preparation of this memorandum were (1) to estimate changes in the volume and composition of Soviet civilian employment and (2) to estimate and project the total Soviet labor supply over a series of years, taking into account changes in the composition of the population by age and sex and in the size of school enrollments.

## 1. Estimation of Civilian Employment.

Two objectives were involved in estimating civilian employment. The first included the compilation of employment data for as many employment categories as possible for 1950-56 in order to determine trends in transfers between the major components of the labor supply. The second was to classify the total labor supply according to age and sex for 1956, the base year for computation of the rates of participation of the working-age population in the labor supply.

Compilation of fairly firm figures on civilian employment in the working ages (15 to 69) in the USSR appears possible for 1950-56 for four major employment components. As shown in Table 2,\* these components consist of (a) workers and employees; (b) kolkhozniki and private peasants; (c) industrial cooperative handicraftsmen; and (d) workers in certain small groups (private handicraftsmen and workers for the Communist Party, the Komsomols, the Pioneers, and DOSAAF). These components constitute the bulk of total civilian employment and, in 1956, accounted for 92 percent of the total persons estimated to be economically active. Official figures are available on the annual average number of workers and employees in all years shown in Table 2. Official figures on the number of industrial cooperative handicraftsmen are given for 1953-56 (end of years). The percentage that these workers are of total Soviet civilian employment is also officially reported for 1950.

The estimates of employment of kolkhozniki and private peasants are more uncertain, being derived from official manpower data for 1950, 1953, and 1955-56 and from labor input data for intervening

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<sup>\*</sup> Table 2 follows on p. 8.

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Table 2

Estimated Civilian Employment in the Working Ages (15 to 69) in the USSR, by Type of Worker 1950-57

R	elea	se 1999/	09/2	21	: (		۹-	RI	OP7	5
Million		Total Civilian Employment c/	83.4	83. 6.	9 <del>, 1</del> 0	0.4°0	88.3	4.06	93.p 9.40	
	Ker	Private Handicraftsmen and Workers of Party, Komsomol, DOSAAF, and the Like b	0.0	~ 1 0 C	• •		) (		0.0	
	Employment, by Type of Worker	Members of Industrial Cooperatives b/	יי יי		-∞• Π Η	1.9	1.00	, a,	1 H	
	Civilian Empl	Kolkhozniki and Private Peasants b/	45.8 40.9	40.0	38.8	38.5	39.7	41.0	41.0	
		Workers and Employees a/	0.04 0.04	42.2	43.7	47.3	† <b>.</b> 8†	50.5	52.2 d/	
	-1	Year	1950	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	

Given in annual averages.

farmers pertain to nonstate farm workers 15 to 69 years old, not to workers 12 years old or older, the The estimates of derived from official and estimated data. concept usually adopted in Soviet terminology to describe total kolkhoz employment. Given in year-end (on hand) estimates,

Does not include hired workers in kolkhoz industry; workers 12 to 14 years of age; family workers on private plots of workers and employees; personal and domestic servants; and civilian employees of the

Based on the assumption that the USSR will add 1.7 million workers and employees as planned during 1957. Ministry of Defense, the MVD, and the KGB.

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years. The official manpower data are of two types. The first consists of official percentages that able-bodied kolkhozniki and private peasants are of total Soviet employment in 1950 and 1955. The second consists of a recent report that the number of able-bodied kolkhozniki in 1956 had increased by 2.6 million over the number in 1953.

Because able-bodied kolkhozniki and private peasants are conventionally defined as male workers 16 to 59 years old and females 16 to 54, other data had to be used to determine employment in the wider working age range (15 to 69) for 1950, 1953, and 1955-56. For this purpose, official data on the number of labor inputs in total as well as per worker and per household -- together with demographic estimates of the number of non-able-bodied workers each year between 1950 and 1956 -were employed. The results of the use of these data were estimates of total employment of kolkhozniki and private peasants 12 years of age and older each year during the period. Workers 12 to 14 years of age were then deducted on the basis of demographic estimates. Workers 70 years of age and older were treated as if they were 60 to 69 years of age because few workers are normally above 69 years of age. Employment estimates of kolkhozniki and private peasants in 1951-52 and in 1954 were derived principally by interpolation between the years of more certain data.

The estimates of the number of workers in certain small groups are probably rather shaky estimates, although the categories are officially reported to be so small that a large percentage of error in the total number of these workers would not affect total civilian employment estimates markedly. The trends are probably representative. Among the estimates for these small groups the best are those for the number of private handicraftsmen in the USSR. These estimates are calculated from reported percentages that these workers are of total Soviet employment. The estimates of workers for the Party, Komsomols, Pioneers, and DOSAAF are based essentially on the ratio of 50 Party members per Party employee -- that is, the Party dues from 50 members may be enough to maintain 1 Party worker who in 1954 may have obtained an average wage of about 8,500 rubles per year. This annual wage would require about 1 week's wages from each member per year.

Classification of the 1956 total labor supply (101.7 million workers) by age and sex was accomplished in two stages, first for civilian employment (93.2 million) and, second, for residual category (about 8.5 million). The age groups are 15 to 19, 20 to 59, and 60 to 69. The estimate of civilian employment by age in 1956 is based on the assumptions that all workers except farmers are legally required to be 16 years of

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age or older and that for all practical purposes all workers were less than 70 years of age. Estimation of 15-year-old workers was a problem, therefore, of essentially determining the number of 15year-old kolkhozniki. The number of these workers on private peasant farms is probably negligible because the total number of private peasant workers in 1956 is less than 300,000. In addition to the fact that 15-year-old nonfarm persons may not legally be considered as employed, it must be recognized that large numbers of youths in the age range from 15 to 19 in 1956 could not enter civilian employment for the following reasons: large numbers of these youths of both sexes were in school full time, large numbers of the females were pregnant and occupied in homemaking activities, probably 2.2 million males were on duty in the armed forces (about half the servicemen are 18 or 19 years of age), and others are unemployed, sick, or disabled. It is thus probable that only about one-third of all males and perhaps 40 percent of the females in the age group 15 to 19 were at work in 1956. As suggested above, demographic and labor input data were used to determine the total number of workers 60 years of age and older in civilian employment. Of the total number of these workers in 1956 (about 5.3 million), the majority -- 3.7 million -- were farm workers, and the remainder -- 1.6 million -- were nonfarm workers. The age composition of civilian employment indicates that, of the estimated 93.2 million workers in 1956 in the 4 major civilian components, 8.2 million were 15 to 19 years of age, 79.7 million were 20 to 59 years of age, and 5.3 million were 60 to 69 years of age.

The sex distribution of civilian employment is based partly on direct official data and partly on derived data. Official estimates are given directly for workers and employees. Estimates of the sex distribution of employment on kolkhozes are derived from official data on the percentage distribution of labor inputs earnings by women and from observations by US officials in the USSR on the proportions of females 16 years of age and older in kolkhoz employment (about 60 percent in 1950 and about 57 percent in 1955). In the age group 60 to 69, demographic data indicate that about 60 percent of employed kolkhozniki and private peasants were females in 1956 and that the situation was reversed for other civilian components -- only about 35 percent of the older workers were females in these components. With these data available and the percentage estimates available on the number of persons by sex at work in the age group 15 to 19 the problem of determining the sex composition of the age group 20 to 59 is a matter of computation. The results of these estimates indicate an age classification of civilian employment for 1956 slightly weighted in favor of females -- 56.1 percent in the age group 15 to 19, 50.1 percent

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in the age group 20 to 59, and 50.6 percent in the age group 60 to 69.

The four major civilian employment components do not exhaust the total number of workers in the USSR. In 1956 the total number of workers in the estimated labor supply (101.7 million) included 8.5 million workers of uncertain status. Data on the trends in the size of the various components in this "other" category are scanty. About 4.5 million persons in 1956 may have been on duty in the armed forces. In addition. 2 million workers probably consisted of unemployed workers actively seeking work. The remaining 2 million workers include (a) forced laborers working directly on projects under MVD control and (b) civilian employees in personal and domestic service; in kolkhoz industrial enterprises; and in the Ministry of Defense, the MVD, and the KGB. It is estimated that the sex composition of these 8.5 million workers is predominantly male, probably not including more than 1 million females in 1956. Certainly the 4.5 million servicemen and the majority of the forced laborers may be considered males. By age, all of these workers were treated as if they were less than 60 years of age. Only a fourth (2.2 million) of the 8.5 million total were probably younger than 20 years of age -- that is, about half of the men in military service.

## 2. Projections of the Total Labor Supply.

The projection of the total labor supply for 1950-65 depends, as stated above, on having available a set of standard rates of work participation for each age and sex group of the population in the working ages. These standard rates may be calculated by comparison of the age-sex composition of the total labor supply 15 to 69 years of age with the age-sex composition of the total population 15 to 69 years of age. A more refined set of rates was established in this report on the 1956 base year by comparison of the age-sex composition of the total labor supply with the total population in the working ages not in school. These rates, shown in Table 3,\* were held constant in computing the whole series of total labor supply estimates given in Table 4,\*\* the assumption being that participation rates vary little over short periods of time.

The estimates of total population in the working ages, shown in Table 3 for 1956 and available each year from 1950 to 1965, were obtained from projected population data provided in an unpublished study by the Bureau of the Census, US Department of Commerce. Also shown\*\*\*

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<sup>\*</sup> Table 3 follows on p. 12

<sup>\*\*</sup> Table 4 follows on p. 13.

<sup>\*\*\*</sup> Continued on p. 14.

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Table 3

Estimated Population in the Working Ages (15 to 69), by School Attendance, and Participation in the Labor Supply, by Age and Sex, in the USSR a/

	Populatic by	Population in the Working Ages, by School Attendance	rking Ages, ndance		Percentage of Population
Age by Sex	Total (Million)	In School (Million)	Not in School (Million)	Total Labor Supply b/ (Million)	in the Working Ages Who Are Not in School and Who Are in the Labor Supply
Males					
15 to 19 20 to 59 60 to 69	1.84 1.34	3.0 4.0	8.1 47.7 4.1	و. 6.0 6.0	574 8.5.4 8.5.4
Subtotal	63.3	3.4	59.9	53.5	\oldots
Females					
15 to 19 20 to 59 60 to 69	10.6 58.2 5.7	3.1 0.4	7.5 57.8 5.7	4.6 4.0.9 2.7	61.3 70.8 47.4
Subtotal	74.5	3.5	77.0	1,8.2	ેગ
Total					
15 to 19 20 to 59 60 to 69	21.7 106.3 9.8	6.1	15.6 105.5 9.8	10.5 85.9 5.3	ঠাঠাঠা
Total	137.8	6.9	130.9	101.7	/01

a. Annual averages.
b. Including 93.2 million workers estimated to be in civilian employment plus 8.5 million others in worker components of uncertain size.
c. The totals are not given, because they are not vital to the computations in Table 4, p. 13, below.

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Table 4
Estimated Labor Supply in the USSR, by Age Group, and the Percentage of Males in the Labor Supply a/

1950-65

Total Labor Supply, by Age (Million) Annual Percentage 15 to 19 20 to 59 60 to 69 Total Increase of Males Year 51.4 9.4 77.7 4.5 91.6 1950 4.6 92.9 1.3 51.7 8.9 79.4 1951 94.9 51.8 4.7 2.0 9.5 80.7 1952 96.6 52.1 9.8 82.0 4.8 1.7 1953 1954 83.2 5.0 98.4 1.8 52.2 10.2 5.2 1.6 52.5 84.4 100.0 1955 10.4 5.3 52.6 85.9 101.7 1.7 1956 10.5 5.5 5.7 5.9 103.1 1.4 52.8 1957 87.7 9.9 1.4 53.0 9.0 104.5 89.8 1.958 105.8 53.1 1.3 1959 7.8 92.1 106.9 1.1 53.2 6.3 1960 6.7 93.9 107.8 1961 5.8 95.3 6.7 0.9 53.3 96.6 7.1 108.8 1.0 53.5 1962 5.1 53.8 109.4 0.6 4.8 7.4 1963 97.2 53.8 110.4 1.0 4.9 97.6 1964 7.9 53.8 5.5 97.6 8.3 111.4 1.0 1965 Increments of Workers +0.7 +8.4 b/ +6.7 +1.7 1950-55 +1.0 +1.1 +6.9 +1.4 +9.5 1955-60 -3.7 +2.0 +4.5 1960-65 **-1.**2 +3.7 +0.9

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a. Estimated by applying the age-sex specific rates of work participation given in Table 3, p.12, above, to the corresponding age-sex structure of the working-age population not in school for each year of the series.

b. The 1950-55 increment of total workers, especially those 20 to 59 years of age, may be too large, if participation rates were actually higher in 1950 than assumed.

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in Table 3 are the 1956 estimates of the age-sex composition of the student population and hence by subtraction the age-sex composition of the working-age population not in school. Similar deductions were made for each year of the 1950-65 period.

The estimates of the working-age population were adjusted for school enrollments in this report because of the steady rise in the proportions of students in secondary and higher educational institutions in the USSR since 1950. This trend is expected to continue upward during the Sixth Five Year Plan, probably leveling off by the end of the Seventh Five Year Plan. If the age groups 15 to 19 and 20 to 59 were not adjusted for changes in the proportions of persons in these ages in school, the multiplication of the unadjusted population figures in these age groups by unadjusted 1956 work participation rates would undoubtedly yield higher estimates of workers in these age groups in 1960 and 1965 than were otherwise obtained.

Other factors in the population could also affect estimation of the total labor supply. Examples of these are changes in the proportions of females married, especially in the age group 20 to 59, and changes in the proportions of workers retiring on pension from the labor supply. But changes like these in the Soviet population were not considered as significant in affecting estimates of total labor supply as the magnitude of the changes occurring in school enrollments in the secondary and educational institutions in the USSR.

#### 3. Deficiencies in the Data.

Since 1939 the Soviet government has provided official data for only a small portion of the field of population and manpower analysis. Only 3 figures are given on total population -- midyear estimate of 191.7 million as the total population for 1940, a midyear estimate of 181.1 million for 1950, and an estimate of 200.2 million for April 1956. Scattered data have appeared on the number of registered voters 18 years of age and older, on birth and death rates, and on the size of school enrollments since 1945. The last census in which age and sex data were enumerated was taken on 17 January 1939. These data provide the basic materials for the population projections by age and sex from 1950 through 1975 used by the Bureau of the Census in the unpublished study referred to above. It is probable, therefore, that the estimates of the working-age population broken down by age and sex which are used in this memorandum (based on the study by the Bureau of the Census) are subject to error.

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In manpower analysis, limited amounts of official data on employment are provided for workers and employees. Certain percentagedistribution tables on total employment are also provided by the 1956 Soviet handbook on the national economy. The usefulness of these tables is limited by the lack of information about the categories omitted and about the terms of reference and the definitions of the categories used. Only one figure is apparently available on the size of the armed forces in recent years. A Soviet official is recently reported to have indicated that the size of the armed forces in 1950 was about 5 million men. But the inclusiveness of this figure is still uncertain. The estimates of employment by component in this memorandum are to a considerable degree calculated from bits and pieces of information. They are therefore subject to unknown ranges of error. Logically considered, however, the basic trends appear to be clear and consistent with the direction of planning by the Soviet government.

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